Strategies for Managing Volunteers during Incident Response: A Systems Approach by Fernandez, Lauren S. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2006-10-00
Strategies for Managing Volunteers
during Incident Response A Systems Approach
Fernandez, Lauren S.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Homeland Security Affairs (October 2006), v.2 no.3
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25078
 1 
Strategies for Managing Volunteers during Incident Response: A 
Systems Approach 
 




During disasters, large numbers of people with no pre-planned role arrive at the scene 
to offer assistance. “Convergence,” which is mass movement or attempted movement 
towards a disaster site, is not a new phenomenon. In his dissertation, Samuel Prince 
described the convergence of people and supplies in response to the 1917 Halifax 
shipping explosion.1 This same phenomenon was recently observed after the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in the United States, and the Kashmir 
Earthquake of 2005. Although estimates of the number of volunteers are pending for 
these events, other recent disasters document substantial volunteer response. After the 
1985 Mexico City earthquake, ten percent of the population (over two million people) 
assisted others.2 In 1989, sixty percent of the population of San Francisco and seventy 
percent of the population in Santa Cruz, California responded to the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake.3 Following 9/11, over 40,000 unsolicited volunteers arrived at Ground Zero 
in New York.4 
Volunteers* can be a significant resource of timely manpower, skills, and abilities, 
while providing valuable insight on a community’s needs. Often, volunteer assistance is 
important because it can be quickly provided by people living or working close to 
damaged areas. Especially in the case of collapsed structures, the actions of volunteers 
can save lives.5 Volunteers can also augment emergency staff with basic skills and 
support activities, allowing responders to focus their efforts on specialized work.6 
Volunteers may bring skills that are lacking or provide them at an economic savings.  
Florida emergency management professionals determined that the economic 
advantages alone are significant enough to justify making volunteers a part of 
emergency plans, and regularly incorporate them during hurricane clean-up.7 In 
addition to helping others, some believe that participating in volunteer service is helpful 
to disaster victims. Volunteerism has been suggested as an avenue to reduce stress, as 
an outlet for rage, as part of the healing process, and as a means of empowering 
victims.8   
Although the media often present volunteer efforts as exclusively positive, serious 
issues and risks are commonly associated with massive convergence. Spontaneous 
volunteers can actually hinder disaster response by creating health, safety, and security 
 
*Volunteers can be categorized by their relationship with the incident command system. Volunteers on an assigned 
resource have a specific assignment within the incident command system (e.g. a volunteer member of a rescue 
squad). Recruited volunteers are personally requested by the incident command system to assist in the effort due to 
their unique and needed skills (e.g. an owner/operator of rare equipment needed for search operations).  
Spontaneous volunteers are not on assigned resource nor have they been specifically recruited (e.g. a citizen that 
wishes to help by distributing supplies). Spontaneous volunteers agree to provide service without additional or 
specific compensation. Unless otherwise noted, the term ‘volunteer’ is used generically in this paper to refer to 




issues, distracting responders from their duties, and interfering with response 
operations. Volunteer efforts can be ineffective because organizations and management 
systems have not prepared for nor considered how to integrate the volunteer resources. 
As a result, response personnel are diverted from their primary duties to consider how 
spontaneous volunteers will be used, to create and assign tasks, to manage logistics 
related to volunteers, and to supervise actions. This commonly occurs in an ad hoc 
manner and because of that can be very inefficient.9 Large numbers of volunteers can 
overwhelm the capacity of an unprepared organization to effectively engage them.10 
Often, there are more volunteers than defined tasks for them to perform.11  As Tom 
Weidemeyer, chief operating officer of United Parcel Service and president of UPS 
Airlines, stated, “It is a paradox — people’s willingness to volunteer versus the system’s 
capacity to use them effectively.”12    
In the absence of a strong volunteer management system, individuals seek to 
perform services using only their own judgment and narrow view of the incident. This 
can result in health and medical issues caused by activities such as medical freelancing 
and contaminated food dissemination.13 Individuals who fill response roles in the early 
stages of an incident may later be unwilling to recognize official response leaders. These 
individuals, referred to as “rogue volunteers,” can cause safety problems.14   
Although volunteers do not receive financial compensation, they do incur costs and 
stress limited resources. Volunteers may arrive ill-equipped, requiring logistical support 
such as food, shelter, and protective equipment.15 Well-meaning individuals can cause 
roadway congestion that prevents the movement of emergency vehicles.16 They can also 
endanger themselves and others in hazardous environments. It is not surprising that 
formal responders can find spontaneous volunteers to be, as depicted by Walter Green, 
"more effort on the part of a strained system than they contribute to the resolution of 
the problem."17 At the same time, significant ill-will can be generated by brusquely 
turning away volunteer assistance, particularly when personnel shortages are obvious to 
the media and the public. 
The challenge for incident managers is to capitalize on the availability of volunteer 
resources while ensuring safety and maximizing the responders’ ability to effectively 
perform tasks within the established incident command system.18 A search of the 
literature reveals that even though sociologists have been documenting this issue for 
almost a century, a comprehensive model for a disaster volunteer management system, 
from incident recognition through recovery, has not been published.  Existing plans 
have contributed a great deal, but gaps remain.   
We found that many existing systems are limited in scale, scope, and operational 
detail. Some examples of under-addressed elements include how the volunteer 
management system is integrated with the incident management system, how 
volunteers are channeled (physically or through information) to avoid unsafe 
conditions, how spontaneous volunteers requiring advanced credentialing are 
processed, how transition to recovery related to volunteers is addressed, and what 
volunteer follow-up is needed post-incident. Existing volunteer management plans and 
systems are also limited in that they often focus on processing volunteers to work for 
only one organization, or focus primarily on pre-incident volunteer registration.   
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If we are to advance our ability to manage the consequences of disaster, it is 
important to examine the use of volunteer assistance in a careful, systems-based 
manner. To accomplish this, the following questions may serve as guidance: 
• What is the impact of a massive volunteer response? 
• What are the essential disaster volunteer management functions that will 
leverage opportunities and manage volunteer-related risks? 
• What strategy can be used to organize the volunteer management functions so 
they can be managed effectively during emergency response? 
• What resources are required to support a volunteer management system? 
 
This article presents a systems-based approach to planning for volunteer management 
in disasters.19 Through analysis of existing volunteer management literature, systems, 
and plans, a comprehensive model is developed to address pre-response, response 
management, and post-response issues relating to volunteers. The methodology is also 
applied to develop and test a real-world volunteer management system for public health 
emergencies in Arlington County, Virginia. There are two driving motivations for 
Arlington’s system: (1) after 9/11, the county experienced a considerable number of 
people who wanted to volunteer assistance and (2) the county’s plans for responding to 
a mass public health event require extensive manpower that exceeds county resources. 
The county plans to use volunteers in the operation of a mass dispensing/ immunization 
clinic and for telephonic monitoring during quarantine and isolation.   
 
Methodology 
A “systems approach” as defined in Emergency Management Principles and Practices 
for Healthcare Systems is a “management strategy that recognizes that disparate 
components must be viewed as inter-related components of a single system, and so 
employs specific methods to achieve and maintain the overarching system. These 
methods include the use of standardized structure and processes and foundational 
knowledge and concepts in the conduct of all related activities.”20  The systems approach 
described in this paper involves analysis to understand the domain and frame the 




We first recognized the issues associated with spontaneous volunteer management 
through professional experience.21 From an incident management perspective, the 
benefits and risks that accompany this spontaneous response are evident.  Although 
various adaptations of volunteer management protocols occurr to address the risks and 
issues, they are generally not addressed in a systemic manner. We conducted a literature 





A comprehensive literature review of the domain revealed specific risks, issues, and 
opportunities that could be categorized into three major areas: spontaneous volunteer 
behaviors, disaster volunteer management issues, and existing volunteer management 
systems and plans. Topics of the literature review appear in Table 1. Sources included 
field studies, after-action reports, news articles, interviews, existing system descriptions, 
and unstructured interviews with emergency managers and disaster volunteer 
management practitioners. The literature review is documented in greater detail in 
other papers,22 but some highlights are provided here. 
Table 1. Literature Review Subject Areas 
Spontaneous Volunteer Behavior 
 
Disaster Volunteer Management 
Issues 
Existing Volunteer Management 
Systems and Plans 
- Who Volunteers  
- Why They Volunteer 
- How They Volunteer 
- Will Volunteers Respond if there is 
a Perceived Threat? 
- Matching Volunteers to Needs can 
be Challenging  
- Volunteer Coordination Requires a 
“Common View” of the Incident 
- Disaster Response Needs are 
Dynamic 
- Volunteer Health and Safety Issues 
- Security and Access Issues 
- Volunteer Response will occur 
Regardless of a Request for their 
Assistance 
- Perception of Volunteer Response 
- Voluntary Agency Volunteer 
Management Planning 
- State Volunteer Management 
Planning 
- Federal Volunteer Management 
Planning 
- National Initiatives 
 
 
Spontaneous volunteer behavior is documented in a number of incident-specific papers 
and a handful of retrospective studies.  The literature revealed that predicting who will 
volunteer is difficult. There is no consistent evidence that gender, ethnicity, wealth, or 
community involvement affects disaster volunteerism;23 however, close proximity to the 
site and personal identification with the victims may increase volunteerism.  The reason 
many people volunteer is to meet a perceived need. Immediately after a disaster, 
traditional emergency responders are often affected themselves and are needed to 
organize incident management. This period can be characterized by perceived poor 
coordination and a “vacuum of authority” during which a number of spontaneous 
volunteers self-organize to address apparent needs.24   
Important disaster volunteer management issues identified through experience and 
literature search include: 
• Volunteer Response will occur regardless of a request for their assistance. The urge 
to “do something” can be overwhelming for those who do not have a formal role in 
the response.18 Even if they were not requested, people will respond if they perceive a 
need or are unable to confirm that what they can offer is not needed. Communication 
of response needs can break down as the complexity and magnitude of a disaster 
grows.   
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• Matching volunteers to needs can be challenging. Organizations that are a part of 
the formal response often turn away spontaneous volunteers because the 
organization is unprepared and has not considered how to integrate them.   
• Volunteer Health and Safety Issues. Spontaneous volunteers at a disaster site can 
cause confusion, compromise response efficiency, and create complications for scene 
safety.25 Although exposed to the same hazards as traditional emergency responders, 
spontaneous volunteers often have less training and protective equipment. 
 
Planning for spontaneous volunteers generally exists at three different levels: 
• Some individual organizations have systems to directly incorporate volunteers. The 
American Red Cross has been a leader in spontaneous volunteer management. These 
systems are limited, however, in that they focus on processing volunteers to work for 
their own organization. (For example, the Red Cross processes volunteers to support 
mass care operations, but it may not be able to integrate citizens to assist in pet 
rescue.) 
• A small number of states and local areas have systems to direct spontaneous 
volunteers to one or more volunteer agencies. Florida and California have strong 
plans and guidance in this area.26 
• At a federal level, the National Response Plan identifies supporting roles and 
functions of the federal government in volunteer management, but notes the primary 
responsibility lies with state and local government.27   
As discussed in the introduction, these systems and plans provide excellent practices 
and concepts, but are also limited in scale, scope, and operational detail.      
 
Structuring (Developing the Issues and Functions Model) 
In the next step, the literature review findings were structured to support systems 
development. Risks and opportunities were mapped against the stages of an incident.  
We then analyzed the risks and opportunities to document interventions (activities that 
mitigate the risks or leverage the opportunities) from existing plans and systems and to 
develop new interventions that we did not find in the literature.  This technique 
(depicted in Figure 1 and applied with examples in Figure 2) is an adaptation of a 
causal-chain framework developed by Johan van Dorp et al. for a maritime risk 
















































Risk: Volunteers come without being 
requested 
Intervention: Recognize the need for 
volunteer management: 
• to manage unsolicited volunteers, 
• to manage identified incident 
requirements that may be met by 
known volunteer capabilities, or 
• to manage the message that no 
volunteers are needed and the 






Risk: Volunteers may lack 
clarity on assignments
Intervention: Provide ‘trouble 






Opportunity: A period of altruism 
follows disaster, predisposing 
people to volunteer if opportunity 
presents
Intervention:  Network with 
professional associations to 
solicit volunteers.
 
Figure 2: Example Issues and Functions 
 
Once high-level functions are identified, functional decomposition was used to identify 
sub-functions and processes for the disaster volunteer management system.29  
Functional decomposition is the “breakdown of the activities of an enterprise into 
progressively [finer] increasing detail.”30 Additional requirements tables are developed 



































Figure 3: Example of Functional Requirements Diagram 
 
As previously discussed, the literature review revealed that volunteer response will occur 
regardless of a request for assistance. An intervention was identified to recognize the 
need for volunteer management to manage unsolicited volunteers and/or the message 
that no volunteers were needed (see example in Figure 2) and then decomposed in the 
“manage volunteer convergence” function. This function contains sub functions for 
perimeter management, information management, and volunteer perception 
management. Figure 3 provides a high-level depiction of functional decomposition.      
 
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 
The systems-based analysis provided an understanding of the problem domain and 
assisted in identifying the major functions of the system. This general model was then 
used to develop a comprehensive system for managing volunteers.   
 
Identification of Goals and Objectives 
It is easy to get carried away in developing many processes/activities to better manage 
disaster volunteers. However, every activity has associated costs and benefits. A clear 
description of system goals and objectives can be used to evaluate the impact of different 
management strategies and associated activities. This step is at the heart of “systems” 
development because it defines the intended effects of the overarching system. 
Volunteer management goals and objectives were documented in an objectives tree (see 




A volunteer management system which will lessen the impact of the 


























Objectives to achieve the goal
 
Figure 4: Goals and Objectives Tree 
 
Concept of Operations 
The concept of operations describes a strategy behind organizing the multiple volunteer 
management functions into a system. Several alternate strategies that expand upon 
current programs and practices were considered: 
 
a) Pre-incident, citizens could develop autonomous networks that would be able to 
respond in their community. The citizens would receive training to work in a 
hazardous environment, provide aid, and have access to appropriate equipment 
and supplies. This strategy is largely that of the Community Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) program. CERT members are trained to assist in their 
neighborhoods following an event when traditional emergency responders are 
not immediately available.31 This strategy was not selected because it was found 
that a large number of citizens are motivated to assist after an event has 
occurred.32  Increasing the preparedness of citizens is very important; however, 
having a relatively small number of pre-trained citizens would likely not 
minimize the disruption to the responder community, nor provide for the safety 
of large numbers of untrained spontaneous volunteers. Any network such as this 
must still be integrated into the incident through credentials verification, specific 
job assignment, a briefing on the job tasks and connection to the job supervisor.  
In 2005, the Harris County, Texas Citizen Corps responded to the need to shelter 
15,000 people in the Houston Astrodome. Keys to success did not point to the 
individual preparedness of its membership, but rather the Citizen Corps’ ability 
to organize pre-registered and spontaneous volunteers and integrate with the 
incident management system.33  
 
b) During a disaster, articulate needs and encourage emergence of independent 
efforts. This strategy is an outgrowth of what has largely occurred in the past.  
Appeals for assistance are observed or made through the media, and independent 
organizations work to meet those needs. This type of response was documented 
after Hurricane Andrew.34 Uncoordinated efforts can lead to misconcentration of 
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aid and duplication of resources.35 To reduce duplication and foster coordination, 
researchers found it is important to have defined organizational roles, task 
management, division of labor, and an overarching management system.36 The 
strategy of encouraging independent efforts may leave critical response needs 
unfilled and result in health and safety issues where too many resources 
converge. 
 
c) Develop a system coordinated by the “formal” responders and pre-trained 
volunteers that can integrate a large number of spontaneous volunteers. This 
strategy essentially transforms spontaneous volunteers (individuals with or 
without specialized skills) into an assigned resource.  We have seen this strategy 
implemented by individual organizations,37 but less often are volunteer needs 
and resources coordinated across organizations. There are often barriers to inter-
organizational coordination such as differences in terminology, procedures, and 
operating structures.38 Potential volunteers may have to search several 
organizations before being able to contribute their skills.  This strategy seeks to 
coordinate a wide variety of volunteer resources against incident needs being met 
by different organizations. 
It is important to note that this strategy is predicated on the following 
assumptions: 
 The emergency management community can recognize that volunteers will 
come; 
 Mechanisms can be created to inform volunteers, and volunteers will act on 
this information; 
 Volunteers will respond to authoritative direction and act responsibly within 
their assigned area. 
 
System Modeling 
One of the core contributions of this systems approach is that it provides ways to 
operationalize, measure, and test the various strategies and procedures to implement 
them. It allows empirical examination of the complex interactions of the system, 
identifies process options that lead to different outcomes, and helps to validate the 
effectiveness of proposed plans before field exercises or an unfortunate accumulation of 
real disasters. The functional analysis (described above in the Systems Based Analysis 
section) provides a wide array of functions and procedures that can be included in a 
volunteer management system. However, it may not be feasible to incorporate all 
identified functions due to cost, timeliness, staff resources, political acceptability, and 
other constraints. While the functions mitigate risks, implementing too many functions 
can also significantly impair the ability of volunteers to quickly contribute to the 
response. For example, implementing background checks of all volunteers may 
contribute to the safety of responders and the community, but the resources needed to 
conduct background checks and the delay it would cause in filling response personnel 
needs may not be worth the “cost.” Spontaneous volunteers may also personally decide 
to circumvent the volunteer management system if they feel it is delaying needed 
assistance they can provide.  Systems modeling can be used to evaluate these tradeoffs.   
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We provide an example of this systems modeling in Figure 5. This is a model for 
Arlington County’s volunteer management system for public health emergencies. It 
begins by translating the concept of operations and system functions into an operational 
flow. Note that the functional analysis was performed from the stage of incident 
recognition through recovery. The modeling work discussed here covers only the 
operations phase and does not depict critical functions such as integration with logistics 
in the incident command system. A full description of the Arlington County Volunteer 






















































Figure 5: Process Flow Chart 
 
This operationalization of the model allows for both the further decomposition of the 
various management steps and provides an opportunity to measure the inputs and 
outputs. These estimates can be derived from comparable industry studies and may be 
obtained from subject matter experts. Analytically, this representation of the volunteer 
management system can be used in the following ways: 
• The model can help pose “what if” questions that are essential to policy and 
tactical decision-making. For example, by altering the rate of at which volunteers 
arrive, processing times, and other design parameters, the model can provide an 
estimate of the end result or impact on the disaster response.   
• This model provides a way to inexpensively experiment with the design that may 
become very useful during a real event. By developing generalized estimates or 
rules of thumb on resource requirements for processing volunteers under various 
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conditions, the model provides a tool to adjust the various parts of the response 
system on the fly, as it were, during incident management.39 For example, if 
managers know that the system can process thirty volunteers per hour with a 
given set of resources, but the incident needs many more volunteers, it can decide 
to devote additional resources for volunteer processing in a calculated manner. 
• The model may identify gaps in the previous requirements analysis, which should 




An adage of disaster management is that planning must be based on valid assumptions 
of the actions people are likely to take.40 It has been repeatedly demonstrated that 
spontaneous volunteers will respond to disasters regardless of a request for assistance, 
and this response is significant. Registration of volunteers pre-incident can help to 
catalog personnel with relevant skills to be called upon in an emergency. However, the 
planning cannot stop there.  It must also consider how these individuals will “plug in to” 
the incident management system, how oversight of their actions will be maintained, how 
their safety and security will be assured, and especially how to manage the many 
volunteers who will spontaneously respond even though they never pre-registered. If a 
specific system is designed before analyzing potential issues, risks, and opportunities, 
there is a danger it will not be realistic and fail. By developing an all-encompassing and 
realistic model, these issues can be anticipated and pre-planned for various scenarios, 
and each volunteer-related activity can be established as an integrated component of a 
single, coordinated system. The strategic approach to model development can also pay 
dividends in training volunteer management staff, because the concepts and objectives 
of the systems can be succinctly presented before delving into task-specific details. 
Providing this “big picture” can be a powerful training tool. 
A comprehensive systems approach is useful not only for pre-plans, but as 
mentioned above may also be used during an incident (i.e., the “incident action 
planning” described in Incident Command System training). Incident managers can 
rapidly develop alternative strategies because the comprehensive model has identified 
decision points and available options/alternative actions, making incident planning 
more efficient. For example, the registration and credentialing of volunteers can be 
designed one way for an event that requires many people with general skills, and 
differently for an event that requires many people with highly specialized skills. For an 
event that requires general skills, basic information (name, address) could be gathered 
by the volunteer processing center using a driver’s license or other acceptable form of 
identification. For incidents requiring specialized skills, procedures can be implemented 
to confirm medical certifications and employment before being credentialed for the 
incident. If approximate processing times for the different types of personnel are 
known, informed decisions can be made “on the fly” about whether to register and 
credential highly skilled personnel separately or together in one queue.  
Resources to register specialized personnel can also be increased or decreased based 
on the quantity and timing of response needs. 
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The strategy selected to provide this illustration of a systems-approach to planning – 
“Develop system coordinated by the “formal” responders and pre-trained volunteers 
that can integrate a large number of spontaneous volunteers” – seeks to ‘fit’ volunteers 
into the broader incident management system. During disasters, of course, many 
volunteers are organized in alternate ways that may complement or undermine the goals 
of the incident management team. By having a holistic set of expectations about how 
one strategy affects the entire incident’s response, the model will quickly identify these 
alternate activities and highlight potential areas of both positive and negative 
consequences. Exceptions to the model – or alternate forms of spontaneous behavior – 
may then be incorporated into the planning model rather than treated as aberrant or 
unproductive behavior.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Paradoxically, one of the most important new challenges in incident management is to 
plan for the unplanned. Spontaneous volunteers, who represent a significant and 
flexible asset in disaster response, also represent a clear management problem if a 
system does not exist to incorporate them through established procedures. The 
challenge for incident managers is to capitalize on the available volunteer resources 
while ensuring safety and the responders’ ability to effectively perform tasks within the 
established incident command system.   
In this article, we have described a systems-based approach to planning for 
spontaneous volunteers that provides a clear analytical roadmap for identifying 
opportunities for intervention and the associated costs and consequences. Intervention 
can occur at various stages in the incident. This systems-based approach identifies ways 
to engage in pre-planning activities, operational actions during the incident, and 
throughout the recovery phase. 
Our current model needs to be implemented and tested against a wide variety of 
disaster scenarios. Currently, the model provides a framework for organizing the many 
disparate findings reported by other researchers and emergency managers. It also 
highlights and makes transparent the planning goals and assumptions. In the end, the 
proposed systems approach challenges emergency managers to reconsider their current 
volunteer management capabilities. At the same time, it provides a pathway for 
managers to think more broadly about the problems of managing spontaneity and 
guidance to prepare their systems to capitalize on the sometimes chaotic, but 
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